Before making a purchase, my wife and I make a habit of asking these five questions. Is it…
needful?
beautiful?
convivial?
wasteful?
simple?
Obviously, most of these terms are positive, one way or another, though #4 is an obvious exception — the answer you hope for there is “no” whereas the others ideally would return “yes.” Nevertheless, there are no hard and fast rules here. Some things truly are needful, and for the exact same reason they are needful, they are inevitably wasteful. Some things are convivial, and that redeems their wastefulness. Some things are beautiful because they are not simple; some things are beautiful because they are simple. (Few wasteful things are truly beautiful, though I imagine there are exceptions.) Many needful things are not beautiful, convivial, or simple, and that is okay.
I own plenty of things that satisfy just one or two of these criteria; several that qualify for three; a few that manage to swing four out of the five. Do I own anything that is needful, beautiful, convivial, and simple all at once — and not wasteful, to boot? If a musical instrument can qualify as “simple,” and if music-making is “needful” (as I take it to be!), then my viola does. Maybe nothing else.
An oddity of philosophical / theological history: the great minds, whom we now remember, often developed their ideas in contradistinction from, not principally a preceding great mind who founded a school, but that school’s later and lesser lights who took their founder’s insight too far — whom we do not now remember.
There could be a worse hermeneutical lens (read: many, many worse lenses) for New Testament theology than the four poems that anchor the opening narrative in Luke’s Gospel: Mary’s song (1:46–55), Zechariah’s prophecy (1:68–79), the angels’ announcement (2:10–14), and Simeon’s blessing (2:29–32).
I personally believe that [the doctrine of the Trinity] has constantly stimulated the course of thought in the West as a challenge and invitation to try and think that which continually transcends the limits of human understanding.
— Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful (and other essays), 5
The great philosopher’s comment — near the outset of his classic essay in aesthetics, “The Relevance of the Beautiful” — hints at the challenge of articulating in a theological/philosophical register something which can only truly be “understood” through being loved, through being worshipped. Here I want to draw attention to a few of the features of my previous articulation of — not the doctrine of Trinity exactly, but its raison d’être.
The articulation of this doctrine is an exercise in biblical interpretation. To be specific, this exercise requires, and presupposes, a kind of theological interpretation of a) the Scriptures of Israel, b) the New Testament, and c) the two Testaments together.
It thus presupposes — even as it inevitably influences — an account of interpretation, viz., an understanding of hermeneutics, which (in order to be adequate for the task) must be philosophically informed.
It also presupposes an account of how the Testaments relate to one another; which is to say it presupposes an account of history — and an adequate account of history must be, well, historically informed.
Furthermore, it presupposes an understanding of creation, as what the Creator is not. Yet that creation is capable of decisively receiving the Creator’s divine nature in the Incarnation of the Eternal Son; thus, the account of nature and creation must itself be Christologically informed.
Finally, it presupposes an account of the church: the community that identifies itself as called by the Father of Jesus Christ, its members sharing in his eternal inheritance through adoption and experiencing (subjectively and objectively) the presence of his life-giving Spirit, and worshipping the Three in — as — One accordingly. (Not to mention: the church has sought to say some authoritative things about the Three-as-One from time to time.)
At least these five factors, as one constructs them, will impinge upon the particular shape and articulation of one’s Trinitarian construction: a two-Testament approach to biblical interpretation; a philosophically informed hermeneutics; a sense of the biblical relation to history; a Christologically informed account of nature and creation; an understanding of the church and its worship. I am certain there are more. (I have not even mentioned where most Protestant theology has begun the task since the sixteenth century: the doctrine of revelation!) But the complexity of the task suggests that the particularities of the doctrine will thus inevitably be, in a sense and to a degree, contingent.
The doctrine of the Trinity is the theological/philosophical apparatus necessary to talk sensibly about and hold together an apparent paradox as truth:
“Hear, O Israel: YHWH is our God, YHWH is One” (Deut. 6:4). The foundational theological confession about the identity and nature of God in Israel’s Scriptures — the confession on which the theological unity of those Scriptures depend — is that there is one God, the sole subject of worship, the sole Creator of heaven and earth and all that is in them, incomparable with any other putative god, incommensurable with any creaturely reality.
“Go and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and teaching them to obey all that I have commanded you” (Mt. 28:19f). The foundational theological confession about the identity and nature of God in the New Testament — the confession on which the theological unity of that Testament depends — is that the One God of Israel is to be rightly worshipped in the person of the Father of Jesus Christ; also worshipped in the person of Jesus Christ, the unique and eternal Son of the Father; and also worshipped in the Spirit of Jesus Christ, who is given freely by the Father to all those who belong to Jesus Christ.
In other words: the Church is right to worship Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as God alone, and in that worship they are (despite appearances!) in essential continuity with Israel’s worship of the One God YHWH. That is what the doctrine of the Trinity is seeking, in a theological register, to articulate.
Why you should not use ChatGPT, large language models, or other “artificial intelligence” (falsely so-called) tools in your research or work, for any of the synthetic tasks (summaries of data or information, etc.) for which it is proposed as a helpful time-saver:
The process of pattern recognition and synthetic integration is the basis of how human beings come to know and understand the world.
This process is an inextricably bodily process in humans. (This is true of human cognition in general: the whole of the human body, not just the brain, is involved in every act of thought — and in fact other bodies are involved, too, because thought is an intersubjective process. But I digress.)
ChatGPT and similar tools are, however, definitionally disembodied. Even if they are in fact “just pattern-recognition machines” (dubious), by virtue of being disembodied their pattern “recognition” is not the same as the real thing in humans.
In fact, insofar as ChatGPT exists in the physical world, it is under a very different sort of embodiment — a non-organic sort — which is antithetical to the human sort.
Therefore, ChatGPT and so forth cannot be trusted to faithfully simulate human knowing — and if the mechanism cannot be trusted neither can the results.
Additionally, by using such a tool, a human being forgoes the opportunity to practice and experience such knowing, kneecapping his or her capacity to learn from the experience.
In a nutshell: the promise of LLMs is “impersonal knowledge” — but no such thing exists. Relying on it is thus, in a meaningful sense, worse than nothing.
Addendum: true personal certainty is much rarer than one thinks. Strictly speaking I am, I think, only confident that 2 + 2 = 4; very confident, since I know from trustworthy authorities that arithmetic may be proven logically consistent and from experience that categories of twos added together produce fours. Confident enough, even, to bet my life (if such a bet were necessary) that adding two to two in any life-threatening scenariorio would make four. Confidence is a real part of knowledge. But am I certain that 2 + 2 = 4? I do not understand the rules and axiomata of mathematical logic by which such statements are proven logically certain in the strong sense. I could, I suppose, be living in a remarkable delusion which has filtered out all experiences of 2 + 2 failing to equal 4 — which seems highly unlikely, but is that not just what such a deluded person might say? My certainty is “only” functional, which is actually — a species of confidence. Is there anything regarding which I am truly certain?
Important to explore, in all fields of life and thought: the practical difference between confidence and certainty. I.e., what action is the right one to take in any given situation may depend significantly on whether you are confident in vs. certain of a given outcome.
“Without even thinking about it, we in the creative class consolidate our class standing through an ingenious code of ‘openness.’ We tend to like open floor plans, casual dress, and eclectic ‘localist’ tastes that are willfully unpretentious. This seems radically egalitarian, because there are no formal hierarchies of taste or social position. But only the most culturally privileged person knows how to navigate a space in which the social rules are mysterious and hidden.”
I think often about two subspecies, or effects, of the phenomenon Brooks describes in this last sentence. The first is how the abandonment of clear status-signaling and deferential modes of address in hierarchical settings — academia and ecclesia being two such realms — actually makes it more challenging for entrants from lower economic and culturally powerful strata to a) accurately navigate those realms upon entering, when they possess the lowest level of power in the hierarchy, and b) be recognized as having truly arrived once they ascend to the higher levels of power. The second is how the contemporary world, despite the radically increased cultural visibility of neurodivergence, is in certain experiential ways a more hostile environment for persons on the autism spectrum, who need clear rules and overt signals for social settings rather than the muddy and inconsistent rules and covert signals with which our neurotypical ruling class is comfortable. Deference and clear social rules are contingent, socially constructed fictions; but they were and are useful fictions, in ways wholly unappreciated by their meritocratic destroyers. No society can function without socially constructed useful fictions. The question is whether or not the new set represents genuine improvement over the old.
UPDATE: My (very clever) wife pointed out that the therapeutic language and culture predominant among the teenage to early-30s set is another manifestation of this phenomenon. The need to “normalize” being “not okay,” seeing a therapist (and talking with friends about what “my therapist says”), having some form of neurodivergence or (at least) severe social anxiety, etc., can be read as both a response to the low-deference, muddy-social-rules culture we now live in and a replacement for older forms of deference and clear social rules. It serves as a way to cope with the unpredictability (uncontrollability?) of the world and as an imposition on it of new, somewhat clearer rules. It makes some social facts certain again. One cannot, in 2023, dismiss a diagnosis (even a self-diagnosis) of a mental health disorder, or do other than honor the boundaries that one’s friend declares he or she is setting, or veto anything that one’s friend’s therapist says — although thanks to a certain ubiquitous podcast advertiser, the idea that you can “get a new therapist” anytime your old one makes you uncomfortable has now been, er, normalized, which severely blunts the scalpel edge that true talk therapy ought to have, slicing through our self-protective layers of irony and self-deception to get at and treat the genuine underlying problems!
To the disciples: “Unless you change and become like a little child, you will never enter the kingdom of heaven” (Mt. 18:3)
To the chief priests and elders: “The tax collectors and the prostitutes go into the kingdom of heaven before you” (Mt. 21:31)
This is what I mean, in yesterday’s post, by “Do not rule out any kinds of questions and observations from the conversation, even ones that (initially) seem unsuited to Bible study or insufficiently sophisticated.” Ask the questions that little children would ask; ask the questions that those on the outs from elite society would ask. This is, notably, difficult for those formed by elite society! The whole enterprise of contemporary Western elite education is meant as much to inculcate the habits of mind and speech proper to the ruling class in its next generation as to render that class accessible to the lower socioeconomic strata. Note well that this last sentence is not a criticism, per se, of contemporary Western elite education; indeed it’s a sentence that could hardly have been written without it. (The various so-called critical theories mostly exist, not principally for the powerless to critique the powerful, but for the already powerful to engage in the discipline of self-critique.) Nevertheless the ruling strata are always peculiarly able and constantly tempted — by Mammon, mostly — to drown out the voice of the Word by virtue of those habits of mind and speech. Wherefore it is a most useful and spiritually edifying exercise to treat them, as frequently as possible, as rubbish. Change, at least for the hour of Bible study, and become like a little child; ask questions of the text (of Jesus!) that the tax collectors and the prostitutes would ask, and follow their lead into the kingdom. With such people Jesus prefers to feast.